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Market Expectations and fed Policy
On Wednesday, the 25th ofJuly, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Paul Volcker presented the Fed's
mid-year report on monetary policy to the Con-
gress. Histestimony was widely interpreted to
mean that the Federal Open MarketCommittee-
the Fed's monetary policy makingarm-had left
its policies unchanged in its July meeting. When
markets closed on the 26th, the yield on 3D-year
Treasury bonds had fallen from 13.13 percentto
12.74 percent. In contrast, the yield on short-term
Treasury bills remained largely unchanged.
Why should an announcementofunchanged
monetary policy have led to adecrease in long-
term bond yields? This Letter shows that such a
movement in rates is consistent with achange in
expectations held by market participants. We
begin by discussing the importance ofexpecta-
tions and then focus on expectations ofFederal
Reserve behavior and how market participants
form these expectations. This discussion provides
the background for examiningthe relationship
between changes in expectations ofFed policy
and the recent behaviorofinterest rates.
Why expectations matter
Expectations are important in financial markets
because an asset is a vehiclefortransferring pur-
chasing power from today intothe future. It is
therefore necessary for financial markets to esti-
mate what assets purchased today will be worth
tomorrow. For example, since inflation affects the
future value ofan asset, a decision aboutwhat
asset to hold will depend upon the forecasted rate
ofinflation. Ifactual inflationturns outnottobe as
expected, participants will, in general, notdo as
well as they might have. Obviously, the larger the
error in forecasting inflation the larger any losses
may be. As a result, firms operating in financial
marketsemploylargenumbersofexperts whouse
sophisticated techniques to prediclinflation and
othereconomic factors thatwill affect the future
value ofassets.
Forecasting Fed behavior is clearly important for
financial market participants since the future state
ofthe economy depends, in part, upon the mone-
tary policy pursued both now and in the future.
An individual who attempts to forecast inflation,
for example, must first try to predictwhatthe
Federal Reserve will dooverthe relevant time
period. We nowexaminethe way in which
individuals form expectations about howthe Fed
will behave in the future.
Predicting Fed behavior
Essentially, the problem ofpredictingwhatthe Fed
will docan be divided intotwocomponents. First,
one must determine what sortofpolicy rule the
Fed is followng, i.e., underwhat conditions will it
undertake a particular step;Second, one must
determine whether the conditionsthatwill evoke
a response accordingto the policy rule actually
exist in the economy.
It is difficultfor outside observers to determine
what rule the Fed is following partly because the
Fed has multipleobjectives and may vary the
importance itattaches to these objectives over
time. For example, at anyone point, the Fed is
likely to be concerned with variables such as the
rate of inflation, interest rates and the unemploy-
ment rate. Outside observers find itdifficultto
determine how strongly the Fed will react to
changes in these numbers. In the past, this has led
to a credibility problem as some observers have
questioned the Fed's determination to pursue its
stated goals. Although there is reason to believe
that credibility is less ofa problem nowwith
regard to the Fed's anti-inflation stand than in the
past, some uncertainty still lingers.
There is greater uncertainty regarding the Fed's
behavior in the short-run. Whilebroad monetary
targets forone-year intervals are announced in
semi-annual reports to Congress, these target
ranges are wideenough to permit considerable
variation in the short-run details ofpolicy.
(The fact that the Fed usually does notattain these
targets has contributed to the credibility problem
mentioned earlieLl Furthermore, since the
FaMe'sdeliberationsare madepubliconlywith a
lag, market participants find itdifficultto deter-
mine what actions the FOMC has taken.
How do market participants cope with this
uncertainty? Underthe conditions discussed
above, individuals infer FOMC actions from theFRBSF
behaviorofvariables most likelyto be affected.
Thus, for instance, individuals focus closely on
movements in the Federal Funds rate and the
monetary aggregates to determine whether policy
is "tight" or "easy" in a particular period. They
also watch these variables overtime to learn how
the Fed reacts in certain circumstances.
Past behavior as guide
Marketparticipants must also determine howthe
Fed will behave in the future. Past information is
relevant in forecasting monetary policyduring
events ofa recurring nature,.e.g., the business
cycle. Ifpast experience suggests that the Fed
tightens credit availability when the economy
grows too fast, it is reasonable to expectthat the
Fed will do the same under similar conditions in
thefuture. The nextthingmarketparticipants must
do is determinewhen sufficient inflationary pres-
sures existin the economyto inducethe Fed to act.
When these conditions are perceived to exist,
individualswill at once modifytheirbehavi6rto
take advantage ofthe Fed's anticipated actions,
having calculated what impactthese actions are
likelyto have.
We nowfocus the remaining discussion on inter-
est rate behavior because of its importance to
financial market participants. Assume, again, that
the Fed is expected to tighten credit in the future.
While short-term interest rates will be expected to
be higher in the future, the market will start
demanding higher interest rates for loans made
today butwhich extend over the period expected
to be subjectto "tight" money.
The "ExpectationsTheory"oftheterm structureof
interest rates provides an explanation for this
market response. The theory is based on arbitrage
behavior by financial market participants, which
presumably ensures that financial assets ofdiffer-
ent maturities are good substitutes foreach other
for any prospective investor. Indeed, ifall securi-
ties were perfect substitutes, investors would buy
and sell securities ofdifferentmaturities to
equalizetheir yields within any holding period.
For example, the expected return from holding a
6-month Treasury Bill to maturity should be the
same as holdingtwosuccessive 3-monthTreasury
Bills to maturity.
That securities ofdifferent maturities are not
perfectsubstitutes in reality does not vitiate the
principal implicationsofthe expectations theory
ofthe term structure. Long-term rates rise along
with short rates ifthe change that led to higher
currentshort rates is expected to be permanent, or
at least longlasting.
Howimportantare such expectations in determin-
ing current interest rates? When the Commerce
Department released its flash estimates forthe
second quarterofthis year on June 20th, the
figures showed that second quarterGNP growth
would likelybe 5.7 percent-an increasethatwas
larger than expected. Bond prices fell by about2
points (or $20 for every $1,000 offace value)
immediately. This reaction is easily understood in
the contextofthe discussion above. The flash
estimates were seen as evidenceofconditionsthat
would force the Fed to tighten credit availability
(in linewith its anti-inflationary "rule") in orderto
slow down an overheated economy. Given that
tight money would raise shortrates, current long-
term rates increased at once, causing long-term
bond prices to fall.
Incorporating new information
Information aboutfactors such as GNP growth
and moneygrowth is useful onlyin circumstances
similar to those that have existed in thepast.
Considerable newuncertainty may exist when
prevailing conditions are unusual. Ifinsufficient
evidence is available, the market is likelyto hold
widely divergent views aboutwhatthe Fed is
likelyto do, and anyaction bythe Fed will surprise
at least some marketparticipants. Those who are
surprised will have to adjust their expectations
aboutthe Fed's future behavior. And any such
revision in expectations will have an impacton
asset prices and interest rates.
There is reasonable evidence to believe that such
a shift in expectations occurred in recent months,
when an increase in the short-term rates was
accompanied by an even greater increase in long-
term rates. Thefollowing figures are evidence. On
January 2nd, the yield on 3-month T-bills was 9
percentwhile that on 30-yearTreasury bonds was
11.9 percent. On the 1st ofMarch, the spread
between the two was almost exactly the same.
However, on the 30th ofMay, while the yield on
3-month Treasury bills had risen onlyto 9.76
percent, the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds was
13.92 percent-adifferenceof4.16 percent.
Iffollows from the discussion above that this
exaggerated response oflong-term rates is possibleonly ifshort-term rates were expected to rise even
more in the future than the increase in current
short rates. Below, we discuss howthis revision in
expectations may haveoccurred. Butbeforedoing
so, itwould be useful topointouthowunusual this
behavior of long rates was in the context ofthe
business cycle. In the past; short-term rates have
risen as the economy moved toward the peak ofa
cyclical expansion, long-term rates have not
varied much. In rare cases, short rates have even
moved higherthan long rates.
Evidence thatthe Fed had "tightened" credit
became availableonlygradually with the upward
driftin the Federal Funds rate overthe March-May
period-from 9.73 percenton March 1st, to 11.09
percent on May 1st. (Note, however, that part of
this increase may have been dueto market condi-
tions.) There are several reasons tobelievethatthis
rate rise came as a surprise. First, some analysts
argued thatarise in interest rates would be harmful
tothedebtsituation ofthe less developed countries
and, through them, to the health ofthe banking
system. Second, other observers argued that the
Fed, being sensitive to political pressures, might
hesitate to raise interest rates in an election year.
Finally, some participants may have felt that the
Fed would nottighten credit given the unusually
high real interest rates that prevailed.
Consequently, there was sufficient reason for
some observers to question whether the Fed
would continue to follow a rigorous anti-inflation
policy. In particular, some analysts believed that
the Fed would nottighten credit even ifthe
economy grew "too fast." However, the rising
Federal Funds rate was evidenceagainstthisbelief.
Marketparticipants realized thatthe Fed would
disregard the factors mentioned above and con-
tinueto behave as itdid in the recent past. This
information, combined with the expectation of
greater credit demands in the future (because the
economy showed no signs ofslowingto a "man-
ageable" level) convinced these participants that
short rates would go up even further.
As aresuIt, long-term rates increased bymorethan
shortrates whenthe Fed tightened creditavailabi1-
ity. Its action signaled to the marketthatthe Fed
would tighten even further in response to the
greater inflationary pressures expected to prevail
in the future. The visible impactofthis upward
revision in expected future short rates was the rise
in current long-term rates in May.
However, sinceMaythere has been Iittleevidence
oftightening bythe Fed. The Federal Funds rate,
for instance, has remained stable in the 11-11 Y2
percent range. The marketalso has interpreted the
Congressional testimony ofChairman Volckerto
indicate that no further tightening has occurred.
As aresult, marketparticipants realized thatfuture
short rates would notbe as high as they had
thought. The subsequent downward revision in
expectations is whatcaused the decline in long
rates mentioned in the beginningofthis Letter,
while short rates remained more or less the same.
Policy implications
The case discussed above illustrates the necessity
oftakingexpectations intoaccountwhen interpre-
ting economic developments and drawingpolicy
implications. The increase in longrates thatoccur-
red from April to May coincided with an increase
in the Federal Funds rate. Some observers had
suggested that afuture increase in this rate would
lead to even greater increases in bond yields.
However, our analysis has shown thatthe two
changes coincided because market participants
interpreted the increase in the funds rate as a
signal ofgreater restraint bythe Fed in the future.
Long rates declined (relative to short rates) when
this increased restraint failed to materialize.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 181,303 - 555 5,278 4.8
Loans and Leases1 6 162,262 - 610 6,907 7.2
Commercial and Industrial 48,911 - 32 2,948 10.4
Real estate 60,538 - 2 1,639 4.5
Loans to Individuals 29,041 54 2,390 14.5
Leases 5,030 25 - 33 - 1.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,871 40 - 636 - 8.2
Other Securities2 7,170 14 - 993 - 19.7
Total Deposits 188,455 -1,846 - 2,542 - 2.1
Demand Deposits 43,538 -2,276 - 5,699 - 18.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,747 - 10 - 1,584 - 8.2
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,491 23 - 284 - 3.6
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 132,426 407 3,441 4.3
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 37,824 - 122 - 1,773 - 7.2
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 39,875 - 713 1,710 7.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 18,911 -2,502 - 4,096 - 28.9
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(- )
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephonetransfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately